Sedating Forgotten Children: How Unnecessary Psychotropic Medication Endangers Foster Children’s Rights and Health by Cummings, Matthew M.
Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice
Volume 32
Issue 2 The Way to Carnegie: Practice, Practice,




Sedating Forgotten Children: How Unnecessary
Psychotropic Medication Endangers Foster
Children’s Rights and Health
Matthew M. Cummings
matthew.cummings.2@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/jlsj
Part of the Health Law Commons, and the Juveniles Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For
more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matthew M. Cummings, Sedating Forgotten Children: How Unnecessary Psychotropic Medication
Endangers Foster Children’s Rights and Health, 32 B.C.J.L. & Soc. Just. 357 (2012),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/jlsj/vol32/iss2/8
357 
                                                                                                                     
SEDATING FORGOTTEN CHILDREN: HOW 
UNNECESSARY PSYCHOTROPIC 
MEDICATION ENDANGERS FOSTER 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND HEALTH 
Matthew M. Cummings* 
Abstract: State foster care systems are forcing many foster children to take 
high dosages of dangerous, mind-altering psychotropic medications. State 
actors have little medical background for each child and have limited time 
to diagnose disorders, thereby creating potential constitutional and hu-
man rights violations. States are only supposed to administer psychotropic 
medication to a child when necessary and in the child’s best interest. Many 
children in foster care, however, are heavily medicated despite the difficul-
ties of proving necessity. Those difficulties are due to a combination of di-
agnosis practice, the foster child’s background, and the poor condition of 
state foster care systems. In light of these limitations and the potential for 
using medication solely to curb bad behavior, such high prescription rates 
are unjustified. Many states lack in-depth tracking and oversight measures 
and fail to recognize this problem, thereby allowing abuse to continue and 
potentially preventing foster children from seeking justice. 
Introduction 
 Between February and March 2009, seven-year-old Gabriel Myers 
had multiple therapists, foster home placements, and after-school pro-
grams.1 He lost many of the privileges he typically had at his original 
 
 
* Note Editor, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2011–2012). 
1 Report of Gabriel Myers Work Group, Fla. Department Child. & Families, 1, 3–4 (Nov. 
19, 2009), http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/initiatives/GMWorkgroup/docs/GabrielMyersWork 
GroupReport082009Final.pdf [hereinafter GM Work Group]. Gabriel entered the foster care 
system on June 29, 2008, after being the subject of an abuse report, and subsequently, his 
mother’s arrest. Id. at 3. In the ten months preceding his death and before he moved into 
the Margate foster home, Gabriel “was initially sheltered in a licensed foster home, then, 
after a positive home study, placed with relatives. When that placement broke down, he was 
returned to the licensed home in which he was initially placed.” Id. Unfortunately, his third 
placement fell apart, too, and the foster care system placed him in a foster home in Margate, 
Florida, where he lived when he died. Id. One therapist documented that “it is clear that 
this child is overwhelmed with change and possibly re-experiencing trauma.” Id. During 
the ten months in which Gabriel was in foster care, an older foster child sexually abused 
him and an adult relative in Ohio exposed him to pornography. Report of Gabriel Myers Work 
Group on Child-on-Child Sexual Abuse, Fla. Department Child. & Families, 1 (May 14, 
358 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 32:357 
home and faced changes in the visitation arrangements he had with his 
biological mother.2 During this time, Gabriel acted out on numerous 
occasions and had other behavioral problems; as a result, doctors put 
him on multiple psychotropic medications covered by Medicaid.3 He 
took Lexapro, an antidepressant, and Vyvanse, a medication for atten-
tion deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).4 Then, a doctor—having 
been warned by the FDA for over-prescribing to children—prescribed 
Gabriel Symbyax, a medication not recommended for use in children.5 
Symbyax, a powerful anti-depressant, contains an FDA-required black 
label warning in its packaging because of its potential to cause suicidal 
thoughts in teenagers and children.6 Medicaid paid for Gabriel’s Sym-
byax prescription, despite not qualifying for reimbursement.7 By April 
2009, the Florida Department of Children & Families had Gabriel on 
multiple psychotropic medications, even though his medical records 
lacked the necessary parental consent form.8 
 On April 16, 2009, less than one month after receiving the Sym-
byax prescription, Gabriel stayed home sick from school while his care-
taker’s adult son—Miguel Gould, an unlicensed caregiver—watched 
over him.9 During lunch, Gabriel dumped his soup into the trash and 
then, as Miguel sent him to his room, claimed he wanted to kill him-
self.10 In his room, Gabriel threw his toys and told Miguel that he was 
                                                                                                                      
2010), http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/initiatives/GMWorkgroup/docs/Gabriel%20Myers%20- 
COC%20Report%20May%2014%202010.pdf. Following those incidences, other children 
accused Gabriel of inappropriately touching them at school. Id. at 4. Thus, Gabriel missed 
significant time in school and his aunt and uncle requested that he be removed from their 
care. Id. The Gabriel Myers Work Group noted that while Gabriel was in Florida care “[n]o 
one followed up with Ohio authorities concerning Gabriel’s medical and welfare history, 
and, specifically, his claims of sexual abuse were not investigated in a timely manner.” Id. at 
5. In addition, Gabriel’s treating psychiatrist knew no information regarding a prior history 
of sexual abuse. Id. at 4. 
2 Report of Gabriel Myers Work Group, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
3 Id.; David Sessions, Psychotropic Drug Abuse in Foster Care Costs Government Billions, 
Politics Daily ( June 17, 2010), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/06/17/psychotropic-
drug-abuse-in-foster-care-costs-government-billions. 
4 GM Work Group, supra note 1, at 3–4; Sessions, supra note 3. 
5 Sessions, supra note 3. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. Due to the fact that Symbyax failed to meet the criteria for Medicaid reimburse-
ment, it is illegal for Medicaid to pay for a prescription of Symbyax to a child. Id. 
8 Report of Gabriel Myers Work Group, supra note 1, at 3, 5. 
9 Gabriel Myers Timeline, Fla. Department Child. & Families, 25 (Nov. 19, 2009), 
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/initiatives/GMWorkgroup/docs/GM_timeline.pdf; Report of Gabriel 
Myers Work Group, supra note 1, at 1, 6; Sessions, supra note 3. 
10 Gabriel Myers Timeline, supra note 9, at 25. 
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going to commit suicide.11 Gabriel locked himself in the bathroom and 
Miguel spent “five or ten minutes” opening the door.12 By the time Mi-
guel gained entry, Gabriel was unresponsive and, when first responders 
arrived, it was too late.13 Gabriel had hung himself using the bath-
room’s extendable shower cord, taking his own life less than three 
months after his seventh birthday.14 
 Psychotropic medications are “drugs that affect the psychic func-
tion, behavior and experience of a person using them.”15 Generally, 
psychotropic medications are divided into six classes: stimulants, anti-
depressants, depressants, antipsychotics, mood stabilizers, and anxyioli-
tics (antianxiety).16 These medications, however, carry significant side 
effects.17 Their risks range from constipation, restlessness, and fatigue, 
                                                                                                                      
 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 25–26. Daver Gould, Miguel Gould’s mother and Gabriel’s foster mother, told 
police officers that “‘she received a call from Miguel Gould at about 1300 hours and said 
she could hear Gabriel over the phone shouting that he was not coming out of the bath-
room.’” Id. at 26. Miguel was able to get the door open by using a screwdriver to pick the 
lock. Id. 
13 Id. at 25–26. 
14 See id. at 13, 26. 
15 Roger A. Hughes et al., Flashpoint: Children, Adolescents and Psychotropic Medications, 
Ariz. Health Futures, 4 (Aug. 2006), http://www.slhi.org/publications/issue_briefs/ 
pdfs/ib-2006-August.pdf. Many definitions of psychotropic medications “stress the effect of 
psychotropic drugs on mind, emotions and behavior; or use the term ‘psychoactive’ to 
refer to the ‘active’ effects of these drugs on mental experiences and behavior.” Id. at 4. 
16Angela Olivia Burton, “They Use it Like Candy”: How the Prescription of Psychotropic Drugs to 
State-Involved Children Violates International Law, 35 Brook. J. Int’l L. 453, 466 (2010); Hughes 
et al., supra note 15, at 4. Stimulant medications include medications that treat ADHD, such 
as Adderall (amphetamine) and Ritalin (methylphenidate). Hughes et al., supra note 15, at 4. 
Examples of antidepressant and antianxiety medications include Anafranil (clomipramine), 
Prozac (fluoxetine), and Zoloft (sertraline), as well as the Lexapro and Symbyax adminis-
tered to Gabriel Myers. Id.; Sessions, supra note 3. Antidepressants are also used on children 
for a variety of conditions, including ADHD, depression, anxiety disorders, uncontrollable 
agitation, post-traumatic stress disorder, bulimia, bedwetting, obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(OCD), and aggressive behavior. Burton, supra, at 466 n.54; Hughes et al., supra note 15, at 4. 
Antipsychotics, such as Thorazine (chlorpromazine), are not only used for psychoses—such 
as schizophrenia, mania, and psychotic depression—but are also used in children to treat 
severe ADHD, depression, conduct problems, and aggressive behavior. Burton, supra, at 466 
n.53; Hughes et al., supra note 15, at 4. Mood stabilizing medications such as Depakote (di-
valproex sodium) and Lithobid (lithium carbonate) can be used to treat bipolar disorders, 
aggressive behaviors, and “labile mood with tantrums or rages.” Burton, supra, at 467 n.56; 
Hughes et al., supra note 15, at 4. Finally, anti-anxiety medications are used in children to 
treat seizures, panic attacks, and anxiety or behavior disorders. Burton, supra, at 466 n.55. 
17 See Hughes et al., supra note 15, at 22–28. Psychotropic medications are commonly 
used in children to treat anxiety, depression, ADHD, OCD, eating disorders, bipolar disorder, 
psychosis, autism, aggressive behavior, sleep problems, and bedwetting. Facts for Families: Psy-
chiatric Medication for Children and Adolescents: Part 1—How Medications Are Used, Am. Acad. 
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to more serious complications such as impaired motor skills, convul-
sions, liver damage, and suicidal thoughts.18 Some can even cause 
tardive dyskenisia—a neurological disorder producing “involuntary and 
grotesque movements of the face, mouth, tongue, jaw and extremities 
and which is irreversible in its most severe form” —chronic irreversible 
neurological impairments, and death.19 
 There are few studies analyzing the potential long-term effects of 
psychotropic medications on children or their mental development.20 
The limits of medical science require physicians to diagnose disorders 
warranting psychotropic medication through symptoms rather than 
testing directly for diseases.21 Physicians, psychiatrists, and other prac-
tices are not regulated by the FDA and their prescriptions may be “off-
label,” meaning that they can prescribe higher dosages or medication 
not approved for children.22 According to a 2006 report, the FDA ap-
proved only thirty-one percent of psychotropic medications for chil-
dren, but children took approximately forty-five percent of their psy-
                                                                                                                      
Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 1, 2 ( July 2004), http://www.aacap.org/galleries/ 
FactsForFamilies/21_psychiatric_medication_for_children_and_adolescents_part_one.pdf. 
18 Burton, supra note 16, at 467; Kathleen Knepper, The Importance of Establishing Compe-
tence in Cases Involving the Involuntary Administration of Psychotropic Medication, 20 Law & 
Psychol. Rev. 97, 124–25 (1996); see also Sessions, supra note 3. 
19 Trudi Kirk & Donald N. Bersoff, How Many Procedural Safeguards Does It Take to Get a 
Psychiatrist to Leave the Lightbulb Unchanged? A Due Process Analysis of the MacArthur Treatment 
Competence Study, 2 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 45, 59 (1996); Knepper, supra note 18, at 
125. 
20 See Need to Know on PBS: The Watch List: The Medication of Foster Children (PBS television 
broadcast Jan. 7, 2011), available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/health/video- 
the-watch-list-the-medication-of-foster-children/6232 [hereinafter PBS]. 
21 See id.; see also Bob Jacobs, Legal Strategies to Challenge Chemical Restraint of Children in Fos-
ter Care: A Resource for Child Advocates in Florida, Advocacy Center for Persons with Dis-
abilities, Inc., 7, http://www.guardianadlitem.org/documents/LegalStrategiestoChallenge- 
ChemicalRestraintofChildreninFosterCare.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2012). 
22 Michael W. Naylor et al., Psychotropic Medication Management for Youth in State Care: 
Consent, Oversight, and Policy Considerations, 86 Child Welfare 175, at 177–78 (2007); PBS, 
supra note 20; Psychotropic Medication Utilization Parameters for Foster Children, Tex. Depart-
ment Fam. & Protective Services, 3 (Dec., 2010), http://www.dfps.state.tx.us/docu- 
ments/about/pdf/TxFosterCareParameters-December2010.pdf. In fact, the FDA does not 
limit the manner in which physicians, psychiatrists, and other kinds of practitioners pre-
scribe FDA approved medication. Psychotropic Medication Utilization Parameters for Foster Chil-
dren, supra, at 3. Though these “off-label” uses are not approved in children, “it may repre-
sent the standard of care.” Naylor et al., supra, at 177–78. Physicians are expected to “util-
ize the available evidence, expert opinion, their own clinical experience, and exercise their 
clinical judgment in prescribing what is best for each individual patient.” Psychotropic Medi-
cation Utilization Parameters for Foster Children, supra, at 3. 
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chotropic medications off-label.23 Due to the known side effects, un-
known developmental risks, and mind altering impact, best practices 
dictate that children should only take psychotropic medication when 
absolutely necessary and as a last resort.24 
 Though the state in some instances properly administers psycho-
tropic medication to foster children in need, overcrowded care facili-
ties, high caregiver turnover, and inadequate administration increases 
the risk of over-medication.25 Additionally, practitioners and casework-
ers have discretionary power—deciding what is within the best interest 
of the child—to administer mind-altering medication through Medi-
caid.26 Due to this discretionary authority, psychotropic medication is 
often seen as a way to chemically restrain hyperactive or difficult chil-
dren and not a last resort.27 Every person has the basic human and con-
stitutional right to be free from the dangers of unnecessary, mind-
                                                                                                                      
23 Naylor et al., supra note 22, at 178. In addition, medications like clonidine and di-
valproex can be used to treat some specific medical illnesses for children under the age of 
eighteen but not for treating psychiatric disorders. Id. 
24 See Burton, supra note 16, at 467 (“Best practices dictate that psychotropic drugs 
should be used only as a last resort, and never as the sole approach to addressing chil-
dren’s mental health needs.”); Naylor et al., supra note 22, at 178; Jacqueline A. Sparks & 
Barry L. Duncan, The Ethics and Science of Medicating Children, 6 Ethical Hum. Psychol. & 
Psychiatry 25, 36 (2004) (“[W]e consider the practice of prescribing drugs to youths as 
clearly the last resort, and in many cases, unethical, until other options have been dis-
cussed.”); see also Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003) (“The court must find that 
any alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same re-
sults.”); M. Lynn Crismon & Tami Argo, The Use of Psychotropic Medication for Children in 
Foster Care, 88 Child Welfare 71, 73 (2009) (“Principles of evidence-based medicine rec-
ommend that clinicians should utilize treatments with research-proven evidence for their 
patients before using unproven treatments.”); Psychotropic Medication Utilization Parameters 
for Foster Children, supra note 22, at 3 (“The role of non-pharmacological intervention 
should be considered before beginning a psychotropic medication, except in urgent situa-
tions . . . .”). 
25 See Sandra Stukes Chipungu & Tricia B. Bent-Goodley, Meeting the Challenges of Con-
temporary Foster Care, 14 Future Child. 75, 75 (2004) (discussing the status and inadequa-
cies of state foster care systems); Report of Gabriel Myers Work Group, supra note 1, at 7 (de-
scribing medication practices for the Florida Department of Children & Families); PBS, 
supra note 20 (reporting on psychotropic medication prescriptions of foster children). 
Inadequate administrative measures include poor finances, improper training of caregiv-
ers, inconsistent monitoring, and neglected medical records. See Chipungu & Bent-
Goodley, supra, at 75; Report of Gabriel Myers Work Group, supra note 1, at 7; PBS, supra note 
20. 
26 Maggie Brandow, Note, A Spoonful of Sugar Won’t Help This Medicine Go Down: Psycho-
tropic Drugs for Abused and Neglected Children, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1151, 1161 (1999); see PBS, 
supra note 20 (discussing the administration of psychotropic medication to foster chil-
dren). 
27 See PBS, supra note 20. 
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altering medication.28 These children, however, do not have the means 
to protect their right to avoid unnecessary medication, or alternatively, 
someone interested in securing that right for them.29 
 This Note argues that the government needs to develop a national 
database of medical records, track prescriptions, and adopt stricter ad-
ministration regulations for psychotropic medications to protect the 
rights of foster children. Part I explores the idea of informed consent 
and analyzes the difference between a parent’s right to choose when to 
medicate a child and a state’s decision to do so. Part II illustrates why 
states cannot consistently act in a child’s best interest and should only 
administer psychotropic medication when indisputably necessary. Part 
III addresses why state actors may choose psychotropic medication for 
reasons other than the best interest of the child. Part IV discusses how 
the lack of oversight measures, mixed with wide discretion and quali-
fied immunity, allows this abuse to continue and may work to keep 
these problems out of court. Finally, Part V analyzes what has and needs 
to be done on a state and federal level to ensure the safety of foster 
children. 
                                                                                                                      
28 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179–81; Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 
(1990); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493–94 (1980); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); Burton, supra note 16, at 490–96 (addressing the human 
rights violations caused by the overmedication of foster children); Brandow, supra note 26, 
at 1169–73 (discussing children’s constitutional rights involving psychotropic medication). 
An individual’s right to refuse unwanted medical treatment comes from the general right 
to privacy established in Griswold v. Connecticut. See 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (establish-
ing the right to privacy regarding contraceptive use); James C. O’Leary, Note, An Analysis 
of the Legal Issues Surrounding the Forced Use of Ritalin: Protecting a Child’s Right to “Just Say No,” 
27 New Eng. L. Rev. 1173, 1181 (1993). Children also have the rights to privacy and pro-
tection from unwanted medical treatment because “[c]onstitutional rights do not mature 
and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority.” 
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. 
29 See Laurel K. Leslie et al., Tufts Clinical & Translational Sci. Inst., Multi-
State Study on Psychotropic Medication Oversight in Foster Care 2 (Sept., 2010), 
available at http://www.tuftsctsi.org (under the “About Us” menu, select “Announcements”; 
then follow the “Landmark Report on Psychotropic Medication and Foster Care Calls for 
National Resources” hyperlink; then follow the “study report is available here” hyperlink); 
Report of Gabriel Myers Work Group, supra note 1, at 9 (addressing the failure of Florida foster 
care workers to properly protect Gabriel Myers’s rights). The state may put foster children 
into medical testing experiments without consent if the medication involved in the testing is 
considered beneficial to the child. See Sheryl L. Buske, Foster Children and Pediatric Clinical 
Trials: Access Without Protection Is Not Enough, 14 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 253, 278–80 (2007) 
(discussing the law regarding foster child placement in medical testing experiments). 
2012] How Psychotropic Medication Abuses Foster Children 363 
I. The Basis for Providing Informed Consent for a Child 
 Each patient must give informed consent before undergoing 
medical treatment.30 For those under the age of majority, parents or 
guardians have the right to provide informed consent on their behalf.31 
When a child is in foster care, however, the state does not have a similar 
right and the child’s right to autonomy may sometimes trump state in-
terests.32 
A. The Requirement of Informed Consent 
 Courts have generally held that informed consent is required for 
any medical treatment.33 This is based on the natural and constitu-
tional right of bodily self-determination—the belief that “[e]very hu-
man being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body . . . .”34 Under the doctrine of in-
formed consent, “physicians have a duty to make adequate disclosures 
to patients regarding proposed medical treatment so that patients can 
make knowledgeable choices.”35 
 There are two competing methods to determine whether a physi-
cian’s disclosure is adequate for a patient to give informed consent.36 
First, the reasonable physician standard requires a physician to disclose 
any information that a reasonable physician would provide to the pa-
tient.37 States, however, have generally adopted the second approach, 
                                                                                                                      
30 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724 (1997). 
31 See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, 57 Duke L.J. 
517, 545–48 (2007). 
32 See Knepper, supra note 18, at 106–07; Stephen A. Talmadge, Who Should Determine 
What Is Best for Children in State Custody Who Object to Psychotropic Medication?, 15 Annals 
Health L. 183, 194–95 (2006). 
33 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 724–25 (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 
261, 277 (1990)) (“After reviewing a long line of relevant state cases, we conclude that ‘the 
common law doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right 
of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment’”). 
34 Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914); see also Cruzan, 497 
U.S. at 269. 
35 Richard A. Heinemann, Pushing the Limits of Informed Consent: Johnson v. Kokemoor 
and Physician-Specific Disclosure, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 1079, 1082. The purposes of informed 
consent are: “(1) to promote individual autonomy; (2) to protect the patient subject’s 
status as a human being worthy of respect; (3) to avoid fraud and duress; (4) to encourage 
self-scrutiny by the physician/researcher; (5) to promote rational decision making; and 
(6) to involve the public in important questions about health care policy and research.” 
Talmadge, supra note 32, at 189. 
36 Armand Arabian, Informed Consent: From the Ambivalence of Arato to the Thunder of 
Thor, 10 Issues L. & Med. 261, 262–63 (1994). 
37 Id. at 263. 
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that of the reasonable patient, where a physician must “disclose what-
ever information a reasonable patient would find material . . . .”38 The 
disclosure must include “information relating risks, benefits, and avail-
able alternatives, including no treatment . . . .”39 Accordingly, the 
American Medical Association (AMA) defines informed consent as 
“more than simply getting a patient to sign a written consent form. It is 
a process of communication between a patient and physician that re-
sults in the patient’s authorization or agreement to undergo a specific 
medical intervention.”40 
 For a patient to give informed consent, the patient must fulfill 
three elements: possession of knowledge about the modes of treatment, 
voluntary consent, and competency to determine what is in his or her 
best interest.41 Competency or capacity is “the basic capacity to arrive at 
a decision by assimilating information through a reasonable process of 
thinking.”42 When one is incompetent to give informed consent, that 
person’s guardian must receive the same information and opportunity 
to weigh the risks and benefits.43 The guardian is generally held to the 
best interest standard, and therefore chooses an option that is in the 
incompetent person’s best interest of health and person.44 
 The general view in the United States is that children cannot meet 
the elements required to adequately give informed consent to medical 
treatment.45 Therefore, the child’s parent—absent evidence of abuse 




40 Informed Consent, Am. Med. Ass’n, 1 (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.ama-assn.org/ 
ama/pub/physician-resources/legal-topics/patient-physician-relationship-topics/informed- 
consent.shtml. The AMA says that physicians should discuss with the patient: 1) his or her 
diagnosis, if it is known; 2) the medication’s nature and purpose; 3) the medication’s risks 
and benefits; 4) available alternatives to the medication, regardless of costs or its insurance 
coverage; 5) the risks and benefits of alternative treatments or procedures; and 6) the 
potential risks and benefits of not receiving the medication or treatment. Id. 
41 Brandow, supra note 26, at 1163. 
42 Id. at 1164. Someone who is mentally ill or incompetent to consent to or refuse psy-
chiatric hospitalization is not necessarily incompetent to refuse or give informed consent 
to psychotropic medication. Talmadge, supra note 32, at 188–90. 
43 Talmadge, supra note 32, at 191. 
44 Id. The guardian may also base his or her decision on the “substituted judgment” 
standard, which requires the guardian to make the choice that is most in line with what the 
incompetent person would choose if he or she had the capacity to make the decision. See 
id. at 204; Brandow, supra note 26, at 1159. 
45 See Coleman, supra note 31, at 546–47; Susan D. Hawkins, Note, Protecting the Rights 
and Interests of Competent Minors in Litigated Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 
2075, 2075 (1996). This view remains intact despite several studies showing that adoles-
cents have sufficient capacity to competently make medical decisions and the Supreme 
Court recognizing the right of a minor to have an abortion without state or parental con-
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or neglect—is given authority.46 When a child is in state custody, how-
ever, the state retains the right to choose a treatment.47 Thus, the state 
can medicate children in foster care according to their best interest, 
regardless of their competency and proximity to the age of majority or 
the availability of alternative treatments.48 
B. Parental Rights and Abilities to Provide Informed Consent 
 A parent’s right to decide what is best for a child relies on two 
principles: personal rights and the belief that parents are most suited to 
provide for a child’s best interest.49 Accordingly, parents are usually 
considered the sole authority for their children and receive deference 
in considerations of medical treatment, regardless of the child’s com-
petency.50 
                                                                                                                      
sent. See Coleman, supra note 31, at 547 n.118; Talmadge, supra note 32, at 189–92; Haw-
kins, supra, at 2077, 2095–96; see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (invalidating 
a statute requiring unmarried women under the age of eighteen to get parental consent, 
or at minimum, inform parents of any intentions prior to obtaining judicial approval); 
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (finding that a state 
cannot create a provision “requiring consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a con-
dition for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy”). In 
fact, various studies have “found that choices made by fourteen-year-olds did not differ 
significantly from those of adults in terms of comprehension, understanding of alterna-
tives, rational reasoning, and decision making processes when responding to medical and 
psychological treatment hypotheticals.” Talmadge, supra note 32, at 191. Although the 
competency of minors in making their own medical decisions is a significant issue, this 
Note focuses on all foster children, regardless of whether they have the intellectual capac-
ity and competency to fully comprehend the potential risks and dangers of the psychotro-
pic medication they may be forced to take. 
46 Coleman, supra note 31, at 548–49; see also Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151, 
1152–53 (Pa. 2000) (refusing to adopt a “mature minor doctrine” when a sixteen year-old 
daughter refused medical care because the doctrine would absolve parents’ rights and 
responsibilities to care for their children). 
47 Talmadge, supra note 32, at 183. 
48 See Coleman, supra note 31, at 546–47; Talmadge, supra note 32, at 189–92; Hawkins, 
supra note 45, at 2075; see, e.g., Nixon, 761 A.2d at 1152–53. 
49 See Coleman, supra note 31, at 545–48 (discussing the boundaries of parental au-
thority); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2401, 
2401 (1995) (analyzing the parent-child relationship); Joyce Koo Dalrymple, Note, Seeking 
Asylum Alone: Using the Best Interests of the Child Principle to Protect Unaccompanied Minors, 26 
B.C. Third World L.J. 131, 143–44 (2006) (“There is a presumption that absent a finding 
of abuse or neglect, parents act in the best interests of their children.”). 
50 See Coleman, supra note 31, at 545–48; Scott & Scott, supra note 49, at 2401. 
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1. Parents’ Constitutional Rights to Provide Informed Consent for 
Children 
 The decision to medicate a child involves the rights of both the 
child and the parent.51 A parent’s right is based on the “constitutional 
doctrine of parental autonomy.”52 The Supreme Court has continually 
recognized that an individual’s freedom to determine family matters is 
a constitutionally protected right under the Fourteenth Amendment.53 
“[P]arents are entitled to raise their children as they see fit” and can 
make most of a child’s decisions when the child is a minor.54 Thus, par-
ents receive deference in determining the course of medical treatment 
for children in the same manner as personal medical treatment choices 
for competent individuals.55 Therefore, parents may ignore side effects 
and safer alternative treatments and choose psychotropic medication 
for their children as long as the choice is “recommended by their phy-
sician and . . . has not been totally rejected by all responsible medical 
authority.”56 
                                                                                                                      
51 See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74; Coleman, supra note 31, at 545–48. 
52 Coleman, supra note 31, at 545; see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) 
(“[T]he interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is per-
haps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”); Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1981) (discussing “the fundamental liberty interest of natural 
parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”); Talmadge, supra note 32, at 
183 (“Parents normally have the right to direct the education and upbringing of their 
children as well as to decide whether and when their minor children will get medical 
treatment.”). 
53 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. The courts tend to “defer to parental 
choice in medical treatment cases out of respect for parental authority . . . .” Talmadge, 
supra note 32, at 183. 
54 Coleman, supra note 31, at 546. Due to this doctrine, parents are also given the right 
to make a variety of day-to-day decisions for their children, including “where their children 
go to school, with whom they associate, what treatment they receive in the event they be-
come ill or injured, and in general the values according to which they are raised.” Id. at 
548 (citations omitted); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring); Parham v. 
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (discussing 
“the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children”). 
55 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753; Saratoga Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Hofbauer, 393 
N.E.2d 1009, 1013–14 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that a parent has wide deference in choosing 
the kind of medical care for a child); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 104 (Va. 1995) 
(quoting Malpass v. Morgan, 192 S.E.2d. 794, 799 (Va. 1972)) (“a parent’s rights ‘are to be 
respected if at all consonant with the best interests of the child’”). Courts, however, have 
given less deference to the decisions of divorced or separated parents with joint physical 
and legal custody of a child. See, e.g., Hardin v. Hardin, 711 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1986) (authorizing trial courts to make their own determination of what is best for a child 
when two parents cannot agree); see also Coleman, supra note 31, at 548 n.126. 
56 Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d at 1014. 
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2. Societal Interest in Allowing Parents to Provide Informed Consent 
 Although parental autonomy is based on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, a parent’s right is also based on the best interest of his or her 
child.57 Parents retain the right to act in their child’s best interest be-
cause of their inherent instinct to do so and their ability to make ra-
tional decisions.58 Furthermore, parents placing their children on psy-
chotropic medication are usually most familiar with the child’s behavior 
and needs, and therefore can monitor potential side effects.59 Thus, 
even if the child objects to treatment, parental decisions outweigh the 
child’s decision.60 The parent’s action in the child’s best interest en-
sures protection of the child’s health and safety.61 
 Parental deference, however, is not absolute.62 Courts may rebut 
the presumption of deference in favor of a child’s autonomy if evidence 
shows that the parent puts the child at risk of harm or violates state 
                                                                                                                      
57 Coleman, supra note 31, at 545–48; Scott & Scott, supra note 49, at 2432–37 (discuss-
ing the biological bonds and societal norms that influence parental decision rights); Bran-
dow, supra note 26, at 1159 (discussing how states base parental autonomy on “trusting 
parents to act in the best interest of their children”). 
58 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69; Parham, 442 U.S. at 603 (“Most children, even in adolescence, 
simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their 
need for medical care or treatment. Parents can and must make those judgments.”); 
Coleman, supra note 31, at 546–48 (“[T]he law formally presumes that whatever the par-
ent’s decision, it is in the child’s best interests.”); Brandow, supra note 26, at 1159–61 (dis-
cussing the belief that children “lack the mental competence and maturity possessed by 
adults” to properly give informed consent to medical treatment); Hawkins, supra note 45, 
at 2081. It is worth noting that “[t]his is a dangerous assumption, because even in the most 
ideal situation of a ‘loving, intact, two-parent family,’ there are conflicts of interest between 
parents and child which could prevent the parents from choosing in the child’s best inter-
ests.” Brandow, supra note 26, at 1159–60. Furthermore, a parent may be unable to accu-
rately act in the child’s best interest “because of their own dysfunctional upbringing, lack 
of education, or even mental illness.” Id. at 1160. 
59 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the 
custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”); Haw-
kins, supra note 45, at 2081; Report of Gabriel Myers Work Group, supra note 1, at 4 (stating that 
part of the failure to recognize Gabriel Myers’s problems was that no single individual took 
full responsibility to monitor him and meet his needs). 
60 See Talmadge, supra note 32, at 183. In addition, another theory for allowing parents 
to give consent for their children is that parents may frequently choose the same option as 
the child would if given the opportunity. Brandow, supra note 26, at 1159–60. 
61 Brandow, supra note 26, at 1159–60. 
62 Coleman, supra note 31, at 548; Talmadge, supra note 32, at 183 (“Courts tend to de-
fer to parental choice in medical treatment cases out of respect for parental authority, but 
a court may not always view the best interests of the child in the same way that child’s par-
ents view his or her interests.”). 
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child protection laws through abuse or neglect.63 States, therefore, may 
restrict a parent’s control over his or her child based on its compelling 
interest to protect children from harm.64 
C. States Have Limited Parens Patriae Powers When Choosing a Course of 
Medical Treatment for a Child 
 The state’s authority to determine the medical treatment for a 
child in its custody is based on its limited parens patriae powers.65 
Those parens patriae powers give the state the authority and duty to 
protect those who lack the mental capacity to act in their own best in-
terest.66 With regard to foster children, these powers are based on: “(1) 
the presumption that children lack the mental competence and matur-
ity possessed by adults, (2) the fact that the child’s parents are unfit, 
unwilling, or unable to care for the child, and (3) the requirement that 
the parens patriae power be exercised only to further the best interests of 
the child.”67 Whereas parental interests outweigh a child’s right to per-
sonal autonomy, children in state custody do not necessarily have their 
interests outweighed by the state.68 State decisions of medical treatment 
made without prior consent from the child or parent likely infringes an 
                                                                                                                      
63 Coleman, supra note 31, at 548–49 nn.126–27. Among other things, these laws 
mainly pertain to “physical abuse, emotional abuse, and neglect.” Id. at 549. 
64 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651–52 (1972); Prince, 321 U.S. at 170 (“Parents 
may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical 
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children . . . .”); see also Coleman, supra note 31, at 
549 (“Federal constitutional law generally embraces these boundaries on the ground that 
states have a compelling interest in protecting children from harm and risk that is inten-
tionally inflicted by their parents.”). 
65 Brandow, supra note 26, at 1161. 
66 Id. The doctrine is “grounded in the actual or assumed incapacity of the individual 
to engage in rational decision making in his or her own best interest.” Bruce J. Winick, The 
MacArthur Treatment Competence Study: Legal and Therapeutic Implications, 2 Psychol. Pub. 
Pol’y & L. 137, 145 (1996). 
67 Brandow, supra note 26, at 1161. “[E]ven though a parent has lost the care and cus-
tody of his or her children due to neglect, he or she still retains his or her constitutional 
right (i.e., liberty interest) to the management of important medical decisions for those 
children.” In re Martin F., 820 N.Y.S.2d 759, 772 (Fam. Ct. 2006) (recognizing that a foster 
child’s biological mother’s explicit objection to the state administering psychotropic medi-
cation to her child deserves protection, as long as there was no court order). 
68 See Talmadge, supra note 32, at 195 (“Although the circuit courts seem to be divided, 
it appears that applicable precedent exists for asserting a right to refuse psychotropic 
medication on the basis of liberty interest and constitutional privacy grounds.”); see also 
Brandow, supra note 26, at 1161–63 (arguing for limited state parens patriae power); 
O’Leary, supra note 28, at 1201; supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text. 
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individual’s constitutional and common law rights to privacy and 
autonomy.69 
II. State Administration of Psychotropic Medication to Foster 
Children, Necessity, and Protecting  
the Child’s Best Interest 
 States must make a firm showing of necessity when medicating 
wards with psychotropic medication because the potential for mind-
altering side effects constitutes an intrusive treatment regimen.70 The 
lack of funding for and collaboration between caseworkers and care-
givers sometimes creates a risk of misdiagnosis, and therefore, may im-
pede that showing of necessity.71 
A. Administering Psychotropic Medication Without Consent Is a Severe 
Infringement on Constitutional Rights 
 The Supreme Court has consistently held that the right to privacy 
and bodily integrity grants individuals the freedom from being forced 
to take psychotropic medication.72 The state cannot infringe this right 
without a legitimate interest for treatment that cannot be achieved by 
less intrusive means.73 Medication may curtail individual liberties and 
free will more than most bodily restraints or other treatments because it 
alters the mind and has the potential for long-term side effects.74 
 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the use of psychotropic 
medication in adults emphasizes the constitutional right to be free 
                                                                                                                      
69 See Knepper, supra note 18, at 106–07; Talmadge, supra note 32, at 194–95; supra 
notes 25–29 and accompanying text. 
70 See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 
133–35 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 211, 229 (1990); Talmadge, supra note 32, 
at 183–84, 194–95. In reference to the forced administration of psychotropic medication, 
the court in Rodgers v. Okin, stated “[t]he First Amendment protects the communication of 
ideas. That protected right of communication presupposes a capacity to produce ideas. As 
a practical matter, therefore, the power to produce ideas is fundamental to our cherished 
right to communicate and is entitled to comparable constitutional protection.” 478 F. 
Supp. 1342, 1367 (D. Mass. 1979), vacated sub nom., 457 U.S. 291. 
71 See Burton, supra note 16, at 457; Naylor et al., supra note 22, at 175–78; PBS, supra 
note 20. 
72 See O’Leary, supra note 28, at 1201; see also Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982); 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at 
the thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.”). 
73 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181; O’Leary, supra note 28, at 1201. 
74 See Talmadge, supra note 32, at 184; see also Nancy K. Rhoden, The Right to Refuse Psy-
chotropic Drugs, 15 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 363, 373 (1980) (discussing the idea that forced 
administration may violate an individual’s First Amendment freedom to thought). 
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from forced administration.75 In Washington v. Harper, the Court pro-
hibited medicating a mentally ill inmate unless the state’s interest out-
weighed the “substantial interference” imposed on his constitutional 
rights to liberty.76 In Riggins v. Nevada, the Court held unconstitutional 
the forced administration of anti-psychotic medication to a defendant 
as a “particularly severe” interference with his Fourteenth Amendment 
personal liberty rights.77 The state actions, however, could have been 
justified if treatment was medically appropriate and done for safety, but 
only after “considering less intrusive alternatives . . . .”78 
 The Supreme Court determined this level of appropriateness in 
Sell v. United States, holding that it must be “necessary to further [the 
state’s] interests” when safer or less intrusive treatments “are unlikely to 
achieve substantially the same results.”79 The Court has recognized the 
right to be free from forced administration of psychotropic medication 
for incompetent adults, and would likely extend this same right to chil-
dren if given the opportunity.80 Therefore, states must likely meet a de 
facto higher standard of necessity when choosing psychotropic medica-
tion because the potential for mind-altering side effects creates an in-
trusive treatment regimen.81 
                                                                                                                      
75 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181–82; Riggins, 504 U.S. at 133–35; Harper, 494 U.S. at 229–30; 
Mills, 457 U.S. at 299; see also Talmadge, supra note 32, at 184, 194–95; Brandow, supra note 
26, at 1176 (discussing the Supreme Court’s concerns regarding psychotropic medica-
tion). Furthermore, states may adopt broader and more extensive liberty interests under 
the Due Process Clause than those protected by the Constitution. See Mills, 457 U.S. at 300. 
76 494 U.S. at 229; see also Riggins, 504 U.S. at 133–35. 
77 504 U.S. at 134, 138. 
78 Id. at 135; see Sell, 539 U.S. at 179. 
79 539 U.S. at 181. 
80 See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (“Minors, 
as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”); 
Talmadge, supra note 32, at 194–95 (“Although the circuit courts seem to be divided, it 
appears that applicable precedent exists for asserting a right to refuse psychotropic medi-
cation on the basis of a liberty interest and constitutional privacy grounds.”); Brandow, 
supra note 26, at 1176 (“The law should protect the privacy and bodily integrity of minors 
by taking into account the Supreme Court’s concern regarding forced treatment with psy-
chotropic medications.”); see also Sell, 539 U.S. at 181; Riggins, 504 U.S. at 133–35; Harper, 
494 U.S. at 229; Mills, 457 U.S. at 299. 
81 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181; Riggins, 504 U.S. at 133–35; Harper, 494 U.S. at 229; Tal-
madge, supra note 32, at 183–84, 194–95. In reference to the forced administration of psy-
chotropic medication, the court in Rodgers v. Okin stated, “The First Amendment protects 
the communication of ideas. That protected right of communication presupposes a capac-
ity to produce ideas. As a practical matter, therefore, the power to produce ideas is funda-
mental to our cherished right to communicate and is entitled to comparable constitutional 
protection.” 478 F. Supp. at 1367. 
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B. States Are Ill-Equipped to Consistently Act in the Best Interest  
of All Children in Foster Care 
 State foster care systems may not always act in a child’s best interest 
because they are constricted by finite resources, high turnover rates, lim-
ited training, and poor working conditions.82 Generally, a child’s case-
worker and foster parents are in charge of ensuring compliance with his 
or her best interest, though such duties and responsibilities are not for-
mally delineated.83 As the “face of foster care,” caseworkers make major 
decisions involving the child’s care, including whether to consent to 
psychotropic medication.84 There are two major types of foster parents: 
unrelated foster parents and kin caregivers.85 Kin caregivers are relatives 
of the child and account for less than one-third of foster parents na-
tionwide.86 All foster parents are responsible for monitoring their chil-
dren but, because they cannot make medical decisions, caseworkers 
regularly do not inform them about mental health assessments or ask 
for any feedback.87 States vest this power in caseworkers because they 
                                                                                                                      
 
82 Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental 
Autonomy, in Child, Parent, and State: Law and Policy Reader 460, 462–63 (S. Randall 
Humm et al. eds., 1994); Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 83; Brandow, supra 
note 26, at 1162–63. 
83 See Naylor et al., supra note 22, at 181–83; Anne S. Robertson, Including Parents, Foster 
Parents and Parenting Caregivers in the Assessments and Interventions of Young Children Placed in 
the Foster Care System, 28 Child. & Youth Serv. Rev. 180, 183–87 (2006). See generally Sandra 
Bass et al., Children, Families, and Foster Care: Analysis and Recommendations, 14 Future 
Child. 5 (2004) (discussing the roles of foster parents and caseworkers). 
84 Bass et al., supra note 83, at 18–19, 23–24; see Naylor et al., supra note 22, at 182. 
Once a course of treatment is approved by the prescribing physician or psychiatrist, it is 
common for states to require informed consent through the child’s parent or caseworker. 
Naylor et al., supra note 22, at 182. Nevertheless, in jurisdictions that require parental con-
sent, if the state fails to locate the parent or finds the parent unsuitable to provide in-
formed consent, then the caseworker may provide consent. See id.; Brandow, supra note 26, 
at 1161. In a 2007 study of thirty-seven states, only six require a court order prior to the 
administration of psychotropic medication and, in some of those states, the order is only 
necessary if the parent cannot be located. Naylor et al., supra note 22, at 181–82. 
85 See Bass et al., supra note 83, at 16–18. 
86 See id. at 17. Even though children placed with kin caregivers tend to have greater 
stability in placements compared to children placed with unrelated foster parents, kin 
caregivers tend to be older and have a higher chance of being single, of limited education, 
and poor health. Id. In addition, due to akin caregiver’s ties to the child’s birth parents, he 
or she is more likely to allow unsupervised visits by the child’s parents. Id. In some cases, 
these unsupervised visitations may increase the probability of the child facing repeated 
abuse. Id. 
87 See Hearing on the Utilization of Psychotropic Medication for Children in Foster Care: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Income Security and Family Support of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 
110th Cong. 4 (2008) (testimony of Laurel K. Leslie, of the American Academy of Pediat-
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cannot provide caregivers with the sufficient resources and training 
needed to handle each child’s constantly changing needs or demands.88 
 Therefore, foster parents and caseworkers do not properly col-
laborate to monitor the effects of psychotropic medication on foster 
children.89 Because caseworkers usually only spend a limited period of 
time with a child, the state is simply “too crude an instrument to be-
come an adequate substitute for parents.”90 Compounding the crude 
treatment is the foster child’s complex life experience that may result 
in behavior nearly identical to that of many psychiatric disorders.91 Due 
to the lack of funding and collaboration with caseworkers, caregivers 
are unlikely to distinguish trauma-induced behavior from a psychiatric 
condition and therefore create a risk of misdiagnosis.92 
1. Difficulties in Recruiting and Retaining Trained and Qualified 
Social Workers 
 States cannot recruit and retain social workers to match the grow-
ing need of the foster care system; thus, protection from misdiagnosis 
and the side-effects of psychotropic medication is lacking.93 The foster 
                                                                                                                      
rics), available at http://www.aap.org/advocacy/washing/Testimonies-Statements-Petitions/ 
05-08-08-Leslie-Psychotropics-Meds-Testimony.pdf; Bass et al., supra note 83, at 16–18. 
88 Goldstein, supra note 82, at 463; Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 83; 
Brandow, supra note 26, at 1162. 
89 See Goldstein, supra note 82, at 463; Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 86; 
Brandow, supra note 26, at 1162–63. 
90 Goldstein, supra note 82, at 462–63; see Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 
83; Brandow, supra note 26, at 1162. 
91 See Burton, supra note 16, at 457; Naylor et al., supra note 22, at 176 (“With few excep-
tions, youth in foster care have been physically or sexually abused, neglected, or both.”); 
Brandow, supra note 26, at 1163. Additionally, a child’s history of physical and emotional 
abuse, neglect, and repeated displacements in living arrangements may affect his or her 
clinical presentation. Naylor et al., supra note 22, at 178. For example, the symptoms associ-
ated with bipolar disorder and trauma are so similar that it may take between two and three 
years to determine whether the symptoms are associated with one or the other. See PBS, supra 
note 20. Unfortunately, due to inaccurate medical records and constant changes in place-
ment of foster children, practitioners tend to medicate without being able to ensure whether 
a child’s symptoms are the result of trauma or a bipolar disorder. See id. 
92 See Burton, supra note 16, at 457–58; Naylor et al., supra note 22, at 176; PBS, supra 
note 20. 
93 Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 77, 83, 86; Talmadge, supra note 32, at 
202, 211. The inability to hire and retain staff is not limited solely to caseworkers. See Bass et 
al., supra note 83, at 8. In a 1999 study of thirteen states conducted by the Urban Institute, 
nearly half of the states’ child welfare agencies had a change in leadership within three years. 
Id. (citing Karin Malm et al., Running to Keep in Place: The Continuing Evolution of Our Nation’s 
Child Welfare System, Urban Institute (Oct. 2001), http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/ 
310358_occa54.pdf). 
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care system grew dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s.94 This is due in 
part to the increase in birth rates, maternal incarceration, and parental 
substance abuse.95 Child welfare agencies, however, are unable to attract 
and retain the staff needed to handle these caseloads because of poor 
working conditions, heavy demands, and low salaries, among other rea-
sons.96 Therefore, the state cannot provide the consistent and long-term 
monitoring necessary for children taking psychotropic medication.97 
 Also, most caseworkers are under-qualified or lack the training 
necessary to handle children with developmental needs or disabili-
ties.98 These staffing difficulties inhibit a state’s ability to increase edu-
cation standards for social workers.99 For example, more than eighty-
five percent of all child welfare agencies do not require social workers 
                                                                                                                      
94 Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 77. In 1985, the number of children in 
foster care was reportedly less than 300,000 children; by the year 2000, however, there were 
nearly 570,000 children in foster care at any given time. Id. In 2001, more than 800,000 
children went through the foster care system, with approximately 542,000 in care at any 
given time. See Bass et al., supra note 83, at 6; Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 
77. 
95 Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 77. 
96 See Bass et al., supra note 83, at 24; Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 77, 
83; Brandow, supra note 26, at 1162. As a result of these conditions, ninety percent of state 
welfare agencies reported that they had difficulty recruiting and retaining caseworkers. 
Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 83. Public demand for shorter foster care stays 
has put greater pressure on social workers to provide data on measuring and documenting 
the process leading to reunification with parents or adoption. Bass et al., supra note 83, at 
24; Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 83. In addition, the U.S. General Ac-
countability Office reported that seventy percent of frontline caseworkers have either been 
threatened by violence or have been a victim of violence during the course of their em-
ployment. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-03-357, HHS Could Play a Greater 
Role in Helping Child Welfare Agencies Recruit and Retain Staff 13 (2003). For 
example, one state’s peer exit interviews found that ninety percent of its child protective 
services employees experienced verbal threats, thirty percent were physically attacked, and 
thirteen percent were threatened with a weapon. See id. The administrative demands, risks, 
and low salaries make it more difficult for child welfare agencies to hire skilled social 
workers in the areas where children are the most vulnerable. See Chipungu & Bent-
Goodley, supra note 25, at 83. 
97 See Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 77–79, 83; Talmadge, supra note 32, 
at 202, 211; Brandow, supra note 26, at 1162. The recommended caseload for each case-
worker is between twelve and eighteen cases each. Bass et al., supra note 83, at 23. Depend-
ing on the agency, however, caseworkers are responsible for anywhere between ten to more 
than one hundred cases each. Id. The increased policy demand for reunification and 
adoption requires social workers to spend more “time meeting paperwork requirements 
rather than providing counseling, support, and encouragement . . . .” Chipungu & Bent-
Goodley, supra note 25, at 83. 
98 See Robertson, supra note 83, at 188. 
99 See Bass et al., supra note 83, at 24. Most social welfare agencies do not require de-
grees despite evidence showing that caseworkers with degrees have lower turnover rates 
and higher job performance scores. Id. 
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to have a bachelor’s or master’s degree in social work.100 As a result, 
“only one-third of child welfare workers are trained social workers.”101 
Even if all social workers had these degrees, it is unclear if their educa-
tion would train them to handle children with developmental disabili-
ties or behavioral problems.102 As of 1993, fewer than half of all accred-
ited graduate schools of social work offered courses in “development of 
infants and toddlers with disabilities, parent-professional collaboration, 
and community resources.”103 This general lack of experience and 
training means that caseworkers may agree to place a child on psycho-
tropic medication without being fully aware of the potential risks.104 
2. Difficulties in Recruiting, Retaining, and Training Suitable Foster 
Parents 
 States are unable to recruit and retain the caliber of foster parent 
needed to consistently monitor children and ensure that psychotropic 
                                                                                                                      
100 See id. 
101 Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 83. 
102 See Robertson, supra note 83, at 188. 
103 See D. Michael Malone et al., Social Work Early Intervention for Young Children with De-
velopmental Disabilities, 25 Health & Soc. Work 169, 176 (2000)). The survey respondents 
also indicated no interest in creating such a program where one did not already exist. Id. 
These programs are lacking because of strict course requirements and the belief that train-
ing in these areas would develop in employment. Robertson, supra note 83, at 188. The 
belief that these skills will be obtained while in practice dangerously assumes that practi-
tioners already know best practices, despite limited training and high caseloads. Id. 
104 Bass et al. supra note 83, at 23; Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 83; 
Robertston, supra note 83, at 188; Brandow, supra note 26, at 1162; PBS, supra note 20. See 
generally Tally Moses, The “Other” Effects of Psychotropic Medication: Social Workers’ Perspectives on 
the Psychosocial Effects of Medication Treatment on Adolescent Clients, 25 Child & Adolescent 
Soc. Work J. 205 (2008) (exploring results of a national survey of experienced social workers 
on their perspective about the psychosocial effects of psychotropic medication treatment). 
The Moses study suggests that the majority of social workers feels that harmful psychosocial 
effects of medication are outweighed by its beneficial effects. Moses, supra, at 205, 214. The 
findings further suggest that social workers only look at the global positives and negatives and 
do not think about the specific harmful psychosocial effects of the medication, such as its 
impact on self-confidence, normalization, self-efficacy, social rejection, and dependency. Id. 
at 218–19. For example, despite multiple studies finding that some psychotropic medication 
users have problems “making sense of the personal transformation associated with medica-
tion,” ninety-three percent of social workers disagreed with the statement “‘Taking medication 
has made my client confused about who he/she really is.’” Id. at 219. Due to weak correlations be-
tween answers regarding the beneficial and harmful side effects of the medications, some 
social workers, the study suggests, may not become aware of certain side effects unless they 
take the time to ask children specific questions regarding their experiences on the medica-
tion. See id. at 218–19. 
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medications are being administered appropriately.105 Unstable living 
arrangements and multiple placements undermine a child’s ability to 
develop socially, emotionally, and physically.106 Seventy-five percent of 
foster children have at least one disruption in their foster home place-
ment and one-fifth have three or more changes.107 Being a foster parent 
is arguably one to the most demanding positions one can assume.108 
Not only must foster parents provide for the child’s basic needs, but they 
also must respond to “emotional and behavioral needs appropriately; 
arrange and transport children to medical appointments, mental health 
counseling sessions, and court hearings; advocate on behalf of foster 
children with schools; and arrange visits with birth parents and case-
workers.”109 
 Historically, foster parents received limited compensation and had 
to use their own funds to subsidize some of the child’s care.110 The low 
compensation ideally prevented self-interested people from becoming 
foster parents.111 In modern times, however, societal changes decreased 
the number of homemakers and increased financial strains, thereby 
negatively affecting the number of willing and qualified foster par-
ents.112 
 The general lack of caseworkers has had a trickledown effect on 
their ability to properly train, inform, or assist foster parents.113 Conse-
                                                                                                                      
 
105 See Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 83; Report of Gabriel Myers Work 
Group, supra note 1, at 7. 
106 See Racusin et al., Psychosocial Treatment of Children in Foster Care: A Review, 41 Com-
munity Mental Health J. 199, 207 (2005) (“Separation from caretakers produces emo-
tional insecurity which adversely effects [sic] emotional growth and behavior in later 
childhood . . . .”); Robertson, supra note 83, at 182 (stating that this is the opinion of 
“[v]irtually everyone involved in the care and education of vulnerable children”). 
107 Robertson, supra note 83, at 182, 187. Approximately fifteen percent of children in 
foster care for less than one year experience more than two placements. See Bass et al., 
supra note 83, at 7. Each year a child is in foster care, the likelihood of a placement disrup-
tion occurring that year increases. Id. 
108 See Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 83. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 85. 
111 Teresa Toguchi Swartz, Mothering for the State: Foster Parenting and the Challenges of 
Government-Contracted Carework, 18 Gender & Soc’y 567, 568 (2004). It is not uncommon 
for child welfare agencies and caseworkers to question the motives of foster parents that 
call about not receiving their stipend checks or request reimbursements of costs that are 
covered by Medicaid. See id. at 582. 
112 See Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 83–84; Swartz, supra note 111, at 
571–72. 
113 Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 83–86. More than two-thirds of foster 
parents claim that they were not properly prepared. Id. at 86. Compared to unrelated fos-
ter parents, kin caregivers are less likely to receive case management services or financial 
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quently, many foster parents quit within the first year because of dissat-
isfaction with the experience.114 Foster parent disruption causes emo-
tional insecurity in many foster children, hinders development, pro-
duces detachment disorders, and prevents them from building rela-
tionships with adults and caregivers.115 
 When foster children are frequently moved, their caregivers may 
be unaware of their history or how to deal with their trauma, and may 
misinterpret self-defeating or uncontrollable behavior.116 As a result, a 
foster parent may seek psychiatric medication from a caseworker when 
the child only needs a stable living environment.117 For these children, 
any additional placement changes hinder the monitoring of gradual 
side-effects and positive results of psychotropic medication.118 
3. Incomplete and Inaccurate Medical, Educational, and Family 
Records 
 Foster children risk misdiagnosis because unstable environments 
and independently-operated child welfare agencies allow for incom-
plete medical records and permit diagnoses based solely on apparent 
behavior.119 Foster children do not enter a single foster care system but 
                                                                                                                      
 
assistance. See Bass et al., supra note 83, at 17. For kin to receive federal reimbursements, 
“states must license kin under the same standards as nonrelative foster families, and kin 
must be caring for children from income-eligible households.” Id. Additionally, states have 
broad discretion in determining whether kin receive any foster payments at all. Id. For 
example, in Oregon and California, kin caregivers can only receive foster care payments if 
the foster children are eligible to receive federal reimbursements. Id. 
114 Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 86. Some foster parents complain 
about their experience with social workers, including the inadequate training prior to 
placement, no reinforcement of training once a child is placed, failure to inform foster 
parents about unique child needs, failure to return phone calls, rigorous demands, dis-
trust, and social workers not involving the foster parents in decision-making. See id. at 84, 
86. 
115 Racusin et al., supra note 106, at 207; Robertson, supra note 83, at 182; see PBS, su-
pra note 20. 
116 See, e.g., Report of Gabriel Myers Work Group, supra note 1, at 9; PBS, supra note 20. 
117 See Burton, supra note 16, at 494–95; Racusin, supra note 106, at 207; see also PBS, 
supra note 20. 
118 See Bass et al. supra note 83, at 7; Robertston, supra note 83, at 182; Brandow, supra 
note 26, at 1162; PBS, supra note 20. These behavioral patterns also contribute to the frus-
tration of foster parents that may result in further displacement for the child. See Chipu-
ngu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 83–86; Brandow, supra note 26, at 1162. 
119 See Robertson, supra note 83, at 184 (discussing how diagnostic mistakes of infants and 
young children are made when parents and caregivers are not involved); Forgotten Children: A 
Case for Action for Children and Youth with Disability in Foster Care, Child. Rts., 7 (2006), 
http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/forgotten_children_child- 
ren_with_disabilities_in_foster_care_2006.pdf (“These challenges are further exacerbated by a 
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rather multiple intersecting systems.120 The systems are meant to “cre-
ate a safety net for children” through intersecting and interacting to 
ensure that the child’s needs are met.121 
 Children commonly enter the foster care systems with either in-
complete medical records or no records at all.122 Even though psycho-
tropic drugs are only to be prescribed as a “last resort,” doctors often 
issue prescriptions without seeing full medical records.123 Foster care 
agencies, however, generally fail to share with one another information 
pertaining to the foster children under their control.124 Therefore, 
there is no guarantee that each agency knows the same information 
about a child’s medical, family, temperamental, or scholastic history.125 
This problem worsens when placements span multiple states because 
each state’s system can vary in organization, responsibility, records, 
funding, and assessment practices.126 
 Even though parental rights to give informed consent for children 
make medicating children an easy task, the state administers psychotro-
pic medication at a much higher rate than parents.127 In fact, foster 
                                                                                                                      
general lack of information-sharing, collaboration and communication . . . .”) [hereinafter 
Forgotten Children]; see, e.g., Report of Gabriel Myers Work Group, supra note 1, at 5 (“There was 
inadequate, incomplete, repetitive, and at times inaccurate documentation in Gabriel’s case 
files.”). 
120 Bass et al., supra note 83, at 7. These systems include “[s]tate and local child welfare 
agencies, courts, private service providers, and public agencies that administer other gov-
ernment programs (such as public assistance or welfare, mental health counseling, sub-
stance abuse treatment), and Medicaid . . . .” Id. This also places an additional burden on 
foster parents, as they find it difficult to juggle all the paperwork requirements of each 
system. See id. 
121 See id. 
122 2008 Fact Sheet: Improving Health Care of Children in Foster Care: An Ongoing Collabora-
tion, Wash. St. Department Soc. & Health Services, 2 (2008), http://hrsa.dshs.wa.gov/ 
news/Fact/FS008011FosterCarehealthimprovements.pdf (“Incomplete or inaccessible 
medical records represent one of the biggest challenges in quick, effective care for foster 
children.”); see PBS, supra note 20. 
123 See Sparks & Duncan, supra note 24, at 36; PBS, supra note 20. 
124 See Laurel K. Leslie et al., States’ Perspectives on Medication Use for Emotional and Behav-
ioral Problems Among Children in Foster Care, Nat’l Resource Center for Permanency & 
Fam. Connections (Feb. 2010), http://www.nrcpfc.org/teleconferences/2-10-10/L%20 
Leslie%20medication%20powerpoint.ppt (discussing how child welfare agencies typically 
do not work together); see also Report of Gabriel Myers Work Group, supra note 1, at 4 (discuss-
ing the failures of agencies to properly communicate Gabriel’s history). 
125 See Leslie et al., supra note 124, at 12; see, e.g., Report of Gabriel Myers Work Group, su-
pra note 1, at 5. 
126 See Bass et al., supra note 83, at 7 (discussing variations in state welfare agencies); 
see, e.g., Report of Gabriel Myers Work Group, supra note 1, at 5 (analyzing the failures in com-
munication between Florida and Ohio authorities regarding Gabriel’s sexual abuse). 
127 Brandow, supra note 26, at 1158–59, 1161; Leslie et al., supra note 124. 
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children receive psychotropic medication at a rate over ten times that of 
children living with parents.128 This statistic indicates that states are 
abusing their parens patriae powers and violating foster children’s natu-
ral and constitutional rights by subjecting them to mind-altering medi-
cation.129 
III. Acting in The Foster Child’s Best Interest When 
Administering Psychotropic Medication 
 Though exceeding the parens patriae powers, states sometimes 
administer psychotropic medication to children even when inappropri-
ate if they burden caregivers or are not otherwise easily restrained.130 
This solution incentivizes caseworkers to medicate children as a means 
to quickly manage their caseloads, while foster parents benefit from the 
medication’s low cost and ability to restrain children.131 
A. Using Psychotropic Medication as a Chemical Restraint 
 Although most caregivers generally want to work in the child’s best 
interest, some caregivers use psychotropic medication as a chemical re-
straint.132 Medication used as chemical restraints are administered “for 
the sole purpose of sedating and immobilizing the child.”133 Although 
medical professionals may use this practice on severely deranged and 
dangerous adult mental patients and criminals, chemically restraining 
children is condemned by the American Association of Adolescent Psy-
chiatry, the Child Welfare League, Amnesty International, the Interna-
                                                                                                                      
128 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 1; Mary Ellen Foti et al., Antipsychotic Medication Use 
in Medicaid Children and Adolescents: Report and Resource Guide From a 16-State Study, Medicaid 
Med. Dirs. Learning Network & Rutgers Center Educ. & Res. on Mental Health 
Therapeutics, 14 ( June 2010), http://rci.rutgers.edu/~cseap/MMDLNAPKIDS/Anti- 
psychotic_Use_in_Medicaid_Children_Report_and_Resource_Guide_Final.pdf (analyzing 
psychotropic medication use in the Medicaid system); PBS, supra note 20 (discussing how 
foster children are nine times more likely to be on antipsychotic medication than other chil-
dren on Medicaid); Sessions, supra note 3. 
129 See Burton, supra note 16, at 493; Talmadge, supra note 32, at 184; Brandow, supra 
note 26, at 1162, 1169. 
130 See Brandow, supra note 26, at 1162. 
131 See Burton, supra note 16, at 494–95; Brandow, supra note 26, at 1162. 
132 See Burton, supra note 16, at 494–95; Brandow, supra note 26, at 1162; see also Report of 
Gabriel Myers Work Group, supra note 1, at 7. An investigation by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution 
into companies running foster homes in Georgia uncovered the fact that several of them 
repeatedly used psychotropic medication as a chemical restraint. Sessions, supra note 3. Even 
though these agencies had already received multiple citations, none received a fine greater 
than $500. See id. 
133 Burton, supra note 16, at 492. 
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tional Narcotics Control Board (INCB), and the 1971 United Nations 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances.134 
 Due to the burdens facing the foster care system, chemically re-
straining children provides a quick fix to many of these problems.135 
For example, states may be overly willing to medicate problematic chil-
dren to prevent losing caregivers to burdensome working conditions.136 
As a result, states may medicate children who are either challenging or 
traumatized only because they burden caregivers.137 
B. Medicaid Reimbursements Make Psychotropic Medication the  
Most Cost-Effective Form of Treatment 
 Because most forms of psychotropic medication are covered by 
Medicaid, they are the most attractive treatment to foster parents, ad-
ministering physicians, and caseworkers.138 Medicaid is a federally and 
state-funded health care program that provides services and prescrip-
                                                                                                                      
134 See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179, 181, 186 (2003); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 
291, 299, 306 (1982); Burton, supra note 16, at 454, 492–93; Talmadge, supra note 32, at 
193. In a 2000 report, the INCB expressed concern that high rates of psychotropic medica-
tion use among U.S. children indicates that it is intended to suppress and control child 
behavior that adults find to be “problematic.” See Burton, supra note 16, at 456 & n.10 (cit-
ing Int’l Narcotics Control Bd., Report of the International Narcotics Control 
Board for 2000, ¶¶ 1–49, 161–65 (2000), available at http://www.incb.org/incb/annual_ 
report_2000.html). 
135 Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 20; Burton, supra note 16, at 494–95; Brandow, supra 
note 26, at 1174. “Despite the fact that there is virtually no research to support the use of 
psychotropics on children for such conditions as acute aggression, state-involved children 
are sometimes given these powerful, brain-altering chemicals simply for being aggressive, 
unruly, or otherwise problematic.” Burton, supra note 16, at 493 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). For example, a physician-led review of the medical records of children within 
the Texas foster care system found little support for the aggressive use of psychotropic 
medication and questioned whether its use merely ensured that children acted in compli-
ance with the expectations of foster parents, “not only to make them more submissive dur-
ing care, but, more nefariously, to get more money and public benefits.” Id. at 494–95. 
136 See Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 83; Brandow, supra note 26, at 1162. 
Due to the burdens and restraints of foster home placements, constant therapy and grad-
ual adjustment can become impossible, and caregivers may view medicating disturbed 
children as the only way for these homes to function properly. See Chipungu & Bent-
Goodley, supra note 25, at 83; Brandow, supra note 26, at 1162; Report of Gabriel Myers Work 
Group, supra note 1, at 3. 
137 See Burton, supra note 16, at 494–95; Brandow, supra note 26, at 1175. Prescribing 
physicians may be general practitioners with limited training in psychiatry. See Brandow, 
supra note 26, at 1175. Furthermore, instead of acting in the best interest of the child, 
practitioners may by motivated by the interest of the caregiver in promoting the ability to 
control a child. See id. 
138 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 16, 20; Burton, supra note 16, at 494–95; Bran-
dow, supra note 26, at 1162; PBS, supra note 20. 
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tion reimbursements to low-income individuals, including children in 
the foster care system.139 Although Medicaid reimbursement ensures 
that foster children receive expensive but necessary treatment, it also 
incentivizes overburdened caregivers to choose psychotropic medica-
tion.140 
 Caseworkers may choose psychotropic medication as a means of 
relaxing the financial burden on foster parents because the medica-
tion’s cost does not come out of the caregiver’s limited stipend.141 In 
addition, Medicaid allows overburdened caseworkers to choose psycho-
tropic medication as a quick fix for out of control children, rather than 
lengthy and comprehensive treatment programs.142 These perverse in-
centives mean that a foster child’s best interest may not be taken into 
account when caregivers administer medication.143 
IV. Minimal Data, Tracking, and Oversight Measures May 
Prevent Foster Children from Seeking Relief 
 Despite the danger of psychotropic medication, not all states track 
when and why they are prescribed.144 When states fail to keep adequate 
records, chemically abused children may struggle to find evidence suf-
ficient for use in court to prove that caseworkers infringed their consti-
tutional and personal rights.145 
                                                                                                                      
139 See PBS, supra note 20. 
140 See Leslie et al., supra note 28, at 20; see also PBS, supra note 20. As a result, in 2008 
alone, Medicaid spend over $288.6 million on psychotropic medication for foster children. 
See PBS, supra note 20. 
141 See Burton, supra note 16, at 494–95; Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 
85. 
142 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 20. Due to society’s desire to push for fast solu-
tions to these problems, 
The reimbursement structure of our health care system offers incentives for 
brief medication visits instead of comprehensive, collaborative, and interdis-
ciplinary mental health treatment approaches. Despite research that suggests 
comprehensive treatment approaches are more effective in treating many 
mental health problems commonly seen in youth, the reimbursement struc-
ture of our health care system tends to impede this treatment strategy. 
Id. 
143 Id.; Burton, supra note 16, at 494–95; Brandow, supra note 26, at 1162. 
144 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 6–8, 16; PBS, supra note 20. 
145 See Wilder v. City of New York, 568 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); PBS, supra 
note 20; see also Starkey v. Miller, No. 06-cv-00659-LTB, 2007 WL 4522702, at *14–15 (D. 
Colo. Oct. 17, 2007), aff’d sub nom. Starkey ex rel. A.B. v. Boulder Cnty. Soc. Servs., 569 F.3d 
1244 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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A. Limited National Data, Tracking, and Oversight Measures 
 Even though psychotropic medications endanger health and vio-
late rights of foster children, not every state adequately tracks when and 
why they are prescribed.146 Consent to the use of psychotropic medica-
tion is left solely in the hands of each child’s individual caseworker, re-
gardless of his or her ability to make an informed determination.147 
Foster children remain over-medicated in part because not everyone in 
the child welfare community recognizes the problem.148 
 One reason for this failure is that almost all analyses are state- and 
county-specific, and not national.149 Without statistical analyses or sig-
nificant media attention, states may not realize that compartmentalized 
data systems pose a problem.150 States, therefore, may be unable to 
conduct the research necessary to discover a system’s inadequacies and 
hold irresponsible state actors accountable.151 
 Others may justify overmedication as a result of too many children 
entering the foster care system with severe histories of maltreatment, 
                                                                                                                      
146 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 6–8, 16 (reviewing statistics regarding state poli-
cies in overseeing psychotropic medication administration in foster children); PBS, supra 
note 20; see also supra notes 73–93, 133–138 and accompanying text (discussing the poten-
tial for misdiagnosis and human rights violations that may occur from unnecessarily ad-
ministering psychotropic medication to a non-consenting individual). In 2008, the Foster 
Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act required states to develop oversight 
measures for health and mental health services for foster children. Pub. L. No. 110-351, 
§ 205, 122 stat. 3949, 3961 (2008) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(15) (2006)); 
see Leslie et al., supra note 124. Nevertheless, according to a 2010 study of forty-seven states 
and the District of Columbia, only approximately 54% had developed a written policy or a 
guideline regarding the use of psychotropic medication in foster children. Leslie et al., 
supra note 29, at 1, 5. Of the remaining states, 27% stated that they were in the process of 
developing a program and 19% said they had no plan in place. Id. 
147 See Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 86; Robertson, supra note 83, at 
188; Brandow, supra note 26, at 1162; Leslie et al., supra note 124; PBS, supra note 20. 
148 See Leslie et al., supra note 124 (“Identifying the problem—that is the stage we are 
at—not every one agrees that it is a problem.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
149 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 6; Leslie et al., supra note 124; PBS, supra note 20 
(stating that there is no national data on the issue but it has become a growing concern). 
See generally Carole Keeton Strayhorn, Office of the Comptroller of Pub. Ac-
counts, Texas Health Care Claims Study (2006), available at http://www.window. 
state.tx.us/specialrpt/hcc2006/96-787healthcareclaims06.pdf (analyzing the inadequacies 
of the Texas foster care system); Report of Gabriel Myers Work Group, supra note 1 (reviewing 
the problem in the Florida foster care system). 
150 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 6; PBS, supra note 20; see, e.g., Strayhorn, supra 
note 149, at 141–47 (findings on the inadequacies of the Texas foster care system); Report 
of Gabriel Myers Work Group, supra note 1, at 9–13 (putting together a review group after the 
death of Gabriel Myers in 2009). 
151 See Burton, supra note 16, at 494–95; Leslie et al., supra note 124; PBS, supra note 
20. 
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neglect, sexual abuse, and broken families.152 Without a proper track-
ing system and oversight measures, however, this justification remains a 
hypothesis and the risk of improper diagnosis and abusive prescription 
remains a threat to foster children.153 Even if this hypothesis proves 
correct, the principal rule of medical ethics is “first do no harm” and 
not “first do something.”154 Without ensuring the absolute necessity of 
medications and then balancing the risks, physicians must first imple-
ment other less intrusive courses of treatment.155 Doing so shields chil-
dren from the harms of psychotropic medication and protects their 
right to be free from forced administration.156 
B. The Nature of Psychotropic Disorder Diagnoses, Limited Tracking and 
Oversight Measures, and Qualified Immunity 
 In states with limited tracking or oversight, chemically-abused 
children may have no right to constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 due to the nature of the prescription process and qualified im-
munity.157 State actors that administer and monitor psychotropic medi-
                                                                                                                      
 
152 See Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 77, 79, 84; Forgotten Children, supra 
note 119, at 5 (discussing the likelihood of foster children suffering from issues such as 
birth defects and maltreatment); see also Leslie et al., supra note 124. 
153 See Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 77, 79, 84; Forgotten Children, supra 
note 119, at 5; see also Leslie et al., supra note 124. 
154 See Sparks & Duncan, supra note 24, at 36; PBS, supra note 20; supra note 80 and ac-
companying text; see also Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 79; Forgotten Children, 
supra note 1119, at 5. 
155 See Sparks & Duncan, supra note 24, at 36; PBS, supra note 20. 
156 See Sparks & Duncan, supra note 24, at 36; Talmadge, supra note 32, at 183–84; PBS, 
supra note 20. 
157 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323–24 (1982); 
Henry A. v. Willden, No. 2:10-cv-00528-RCJ-PAL, 2010 WL 4362809, at *7 (D. Nev. Oct. 26, 
2010) (finding the Nevada foster care system to be immune from suit due to the agent’s 
discretionary powers and because it is not clearly established that foster children have “a 
constitutional right to . . . monitory of, administration, and use of psychotropic drugs”); 
Smith v. Rainey, 747 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1343–44 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (rejecting plaintiffs claim 
on the grounds of sovereign immunity and that the claim lacked “factual or legal sup-
port”); Starkey, 2007 WL 4522702, at *15–16 (granting defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim that defendant had ulterior motives when pre-
scribing psychotropic medication because the claim presented “no evidence other than 
the bare allegation itself”); Wilder, 568 F. Supp. at 1137 (The city’s decision to place plain-
tiff on psychotropic medication was “presumptively correct, that presumption may be re-
butted . . . . [by] a fully developed factual record establishing the actual level of treatment 
. . . .”); see also Geller v. Staten Island Dev. Ctr., No. 84-CV-354, 1991 WL 99054, at *18–19 
(N.D.N.Y. June 5, 1991) (entitling defendant to qualified immunity from suit as long as the 
defendant’s practices of administering the psychotropic medications were “in conformity 
with acceptable professional standards existing at the time”). According to 42 U.S.C. 
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cations—namely consenting caseworkers and recommending practitio-
ners—are not liable if they act within their discretionary authority.158 
Courts presume discretionary decisions are valid unless there is “a fully 
developed factual record establishing the actual treatment” that de-
parted from professional standards.159 
  This burden is substantial.160 Diagnosing physicians have wide dis-
cretion when making a recommendation and may avoid liability as long 
as the child’s behavior reflects the symptoms of the disorder.161 Like-
wise, when physicians recommend psychotropic medication, the case-
workers act within their authority when following that advice.162 For ex-
ample, to rebut a qualified immunity defense, the Eleventh Circuit re-
quires proof of deliberate indifference on behalf of the government 
actor.163 To prove deliberate indifference, the claimant must show: “1) 
                                                                                                                      
 
§ 1983, an individual is allowed to seek a civil remedy against the government if an indi-
vidual acting under the state’s authority violated one of the individual’s constitutional or 
federally secured rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Karen W. Yiu, Note, Foster Parents as State 
Actors in Section 1983 Actions: What Rayburn v. Hogue Missed, 7 U. CAL. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & 
POL’Y 117, 117 (2003) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). If a state does not have a system that 
monitors psychotropic medications in foster children, it likely cannot be sued under 
§ 1983 because there is arguably no clearly established constitutional right to the monitor-
ing of the administration of psychotropic medication to children in state custody. See Henry 
A., 2010 WL 4362809, at *7. While § 1983 provides plaintiffs with a means for suing the 
government, a governmental actor may have qualified immunity against such claims. See 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982). Under the rule of qualified immunity, a 
government official is not subject to liability if his or her actions were within the scope of 
discretionary authority, as long as he or she has not violated a “clearly established statutory 
or constitutional right[] of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. at 818. 
158 See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323–24; Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286, 1298 (7th Cir. 
1995); supra note 158 and accompanying text. According to the Supreme Court in Young-
berg v. Romeo, “liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a 
substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to 
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a 
judgment.” 457 U.S. at 323. Furthermore, a practitioner who administers psychotropic 
medication to a child may also be entitled to qualified immunity. See Geller, 1991 WL 99054, 
at *18 (discussing the prescribing doctor’s entitlement to qualified immunity). 
159 Wilder, 568 F. Supp. at 1137; see Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323–24. 
160 See Wilder, 568 F. Supp. at 1137; PBS, supra note 20 (discussing the leeway practitio-
ners have in administering psychotropic medication to foster children and stating that 
medical records for foster children are most often incomplete and inadequate); see also 
Starkey, 2007 WL 4522702, at *13–15. 
161 See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323–24; Feller, 1991 WL 99054, at *17–18; Wilder 568 F. 
Supp. at 1137; PBS, supra note 20 (discussing the practice of medicating foster children 
with psychotropic medication, even with limited medical records, if their behavior coin-
cides with a disorder associated with the medication). 
162 Leslie et al., supra note 124 (discussing how caseworkers are unqualified to question 
the recommending physician’s judgment). 
163 See McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999). The Eleventh Circuit 
joined the Second Circuit in expanding this requirement to “minor[s] in state custody.” 
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subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; 2) disregard of that risk; 
3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.”164 Evidence of delib-
erate indifference, however, may not exist in states without strict over-
sight and tracking measures, thereby potentially preventing chemically 
abused children from nullifying qualified immunity.165 
V. State and Federal Government Solutions 
 There are six general criteria that, if implemented, would success-
fully protect foster children from overmedication.166 In practice, a com-
prehensive and collaborative national database would meet these six cri-
teria, thereby protecting foster children’s safety and constitutional rights 
through dismissal of irresponsible caseworkers and practitioners.167 
A. What States Need to Do to Address Over-Medicated Foster Children 
 Though some states have implemented oversight mechanisms or 
improved healthcare quality to prevent foster children from unjustifia-
bly receiving psychotropic medication, more reform is necessary.168 
Due to the differences between foster care systems, no single policy is 
perfect for all state systems.169 A successful system, however, should ful-
fill six general criteria: it should (1) promote recognition of problems, 
(2) maximize medical data tracking and collection, (3) promote com-
munication and collaboration between the foster organizations and 
                                                                                                                      
Taylor ex rel Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987); see also S.M. v. Feaver, 
2004 WL 213198, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2004). 
164 Feaver, 2004 WL 213198, at *3 (citing McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255). 
165 See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323–24; Starkey, 2007 WL 4522702, at *13–15; Wilder, 568 F. 
Supp. at 1137; PBS, supra note 20 (discussing the motivations against the best interest of 
the child involved in the overuse of psychotropic medication in foster children and the 
need for tracking measures). This is more troubling considering the fact that, in a 2010 
study of forty-eight states measuring what factors states would want to use in an oversight 
system that flags concerning trends in medication, only ten states (21.3%) would look for 
“no documentation of discussion of risks and benefits of medication,” and only fourteen 
states (29.8%) would look for prescribed dosages of medication that are not consistent 
with recommendations. See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 7. 
166 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 9–10, 12–13, 15; Leslie et al., supra note 124. 
167 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 9–10, 12–13, 15; Foti et al., supra note 128, at 38; 
Leslie et al., supra note 124; supra notes 73–82, 134–138 and accompanying text. 
168 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 5 (reporting that approximately fifty-four per-
cent of states in 2010 had a policy in place on psychotropic medication use in foster chil-
dren); Leslie et al., supra note 124 (reporting forty-nine percent of states with a policy in 
place on psychotropic medication use in foster children). 
169 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 1 (discussing policies of various states aimed at 
solving the problem); Foti et al., supra note 128, at 38 (”There was no single essential ap-
proach—each State crafted interventions based on its specific environment.”). 
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stakeholders, (4) create systems of oversight and secondary review of 
consent, (5) train and educate employees on overmedication, and (6) 
gather input from foster parents, biological parents, and children.170 
 The first criterion in a successful system is to make government 
actors recognize the problem of overmedication.171 One efficient way 
to achieve this goal is to collect data and then promote the findings.172 
Some states have already done this, using means such as gathering all 
available local and national data, pooling data with agencies in other 
states, and commissioning independent reports.173 States then need to 
review this data and implement measures limiting the chances of im-
proper psychotropic medication prescription.174 
 To maximize medical data tracking—the second proposed crite-
rion—states should require practitioners to fill out in-depth reports, 
justifying recommendations of psychotropic medication and noting the 
risks, benefits, and alternatives explained to the caseworker.175 This 
data would give a basis for states to hold practitioners accountable for 
inadequate records.176 Another potential oversight measure is to better 
ensure that recipients only take medication prescribed for a legitimate 
purpose.177 Some states have traditionally accomplished this by initially 
screening for health issues within three days after a child enters foster 
care, more thoroughly screening after thirty to sixty days, and requiring 
annual screenings thereafter.178 This further oversight, however, should 
come from an impartial psychiatrist that reviews all prescription deci-
sions or an attorney appointed for the child to represent his or her in-
terests.179 
 States should also collaborate with other organizations, thereby 
fulfilling the third criterion of sharing a common vision of how to ad-
                                                                                                                      
170 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 9–10, 12–13, 15; Leslie et al., supra 124. 
171 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 9; Leslie et al., supra note 124. 
172 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 9; Leslie et al., supra note 124. 
173 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 9. See, e.g., Strayhorn, supra note 149, at 10 (re-
port by the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts); Report of Gabriel Myers Work Group, supra 
note 1, at 7–8 (report commissioned by the Florida Department of Children & Families). 
174 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 9–19; Leslie et al., supra note 124. 
175 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 12; Leslie et al., supra note 124; Sessions, supra 
note 3. 
176 See Leslie et al., supra note 124; Sessions, supra note 3 (questioning the state of 
Georgia for not properly holding practitioners accountable). 
177 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 12. 
178 See id.; Naylor et al., supra note 22, at 183; Leslie et al., supra note 124; see also PBS, 
supra note 20 (discussing motivations that impact psychiatrists’ decisions to medicate over 
therapy). 
179 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 12, 20; Naylor et al., supra note 22, at 183; Leslie 
et al., supra note 124; see also PBS, supra note 20. 
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dress overmedication and effectively communicating the risks.180 This 
would also help provide up-to-date guidelines on acceptable practices, 
allowing caseworkers and foster parents to recognize when medicating 
a child is unnecessary.181 To stop stifling normal behavior, states should 
educate foster parents about behavioral patterns common to foster 
children undergoing placement changes.182 
 Furthermore, some states have already implemented the fourth 
criterion—secondary oversight mechanisms—by setting guidelines 
based on recommendations of the Academy of Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatry, the American Academy of Psychiatry, the Child Welfare 
League of America, or a state-recommended evaluation conducted by 
an appointed agency.183 Practitioners should follow a chosen guideline 
and seek departmental review when psychotropic medication is pre-
scribed outside of the recommendations.184 States should then use this 
information to form a database of foster children’s medical records and 
psychotropic prescriptions—categorized by child, recommending prac-
titioner, and consenting caseworker—by merging the data from Medi-
caid and child welfare agencies.185 Therefore, states will quickly spot out-
                                                                                                                      
180 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 9; Leslie et al., supra note 124 (discussing the 
problem of child welfare agencies not working together); Report of Gabriel Myers Work Group, 
supra note 1, at 4–5, 9, 31 (stating that failures of child welfare agencies to properly com-
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Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 9–10. 
181 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 11. 
182 See Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, supra note 25, at 86–87; Racusin et al., supra note 
106, at 207–09. 
183 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 12 (providing the California Evidence-Based 
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184 See id.; Julie M. Zito et al., Psychotropic Medication Patterns Among Youth in Foster Care, 
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State Health Services created a board, composed of a research pharmacist, a physician, a 
mental health administrator, a child psychologist, six child and adolescent psychiatrists, 
and an adult psychiatrist to write a system of practice guidelines for the administration of 
psychotropic medication in foster children. Zito et al., supra, at e162. The board deter-
mined that the state should require a departmental review “if antipsychotic agents and 
antidepressants were prescribed for youth under age 4 years, stimulants under age 3 years, 
if ≥2 drugs from the same class were prescribed concomitantly, and if ≥5 different classes 
of psychotropic medication were prescribed concomitantly.” Id. Although these guidelines 
are provided, they are not the law and psychiatrists can recommend psychotropic medica-
tion to children despite their existence. PBS, supra note 20. 
185 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 6; PBS, supra note 20. 
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liers and hold accountable irresponsible caseworkers and practitio-
ners.186 
 To promote the fifth criterion of training and educating employ-
ees, states should involve foster parents in decisions on psychotropic 
medication administration.187 This increases familiarity with medica-
tions and potential side effects, thereby allowing for closer monitor-
ing.188 This is a means of training foster parents while gathering their 
input and promoting collaboration.189 
 Finally, to implement the sixth criterion of preserving the rights of 
the biological parents and the child, states should find ways to involve 
them in the decision-making process.190 Even if parents are incapable 
of raising their child, they still have the constitutional right to parental 
autonomy and may have the child’s best interest at heart.191 Addition-
ally, involving them in the decision-making process may alleviate con-
cerns regarding later reunification because it may educate parents 
about their child’s health, behavioral problems, and medication.192 
 Furthermore, involving children in their own medical decisions 
may not only help protect their rights but also may increase the effec-
tiveness of care.193 This would improve relationships with caregivers, 
promote understanding of disorders and treatments, and may increase 
children’s commitment to improving themselves.194 When strict guide-
lines prevent misdiagnosis and cause the termination of irresponsible 
caseworkers and practitioners, children will be less susceptible to co-
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cially older children. Talmadge, supra note 32, at 191–92; Brandow, supra note 26, at 1173–
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erced consent.195 In those situations where a medication’s necessity is 
unclear, parents and the child may provide valuable feedback.196 Fi-
nally, a child’s involvement in the decision-making process may create a 
better treatment experience and ensure preservation of rights.197 
B. States Cannot Protect the Rights and Safety of Foster Children Without 
Implementing National Policies and a National Database 
 The overmedication issue needs prioritization on a national level 
because it is arguably the only way for the government to prevent state 
actors from violating foster children’s constitutional rights.198 Because 
the majority of states lack either Medicaid databases, child welfare da-
tabases, or a combination of both with which to track psychotropic 
medication use, foster children crossing between states may not have 
complete and accurate information in their files.199 Even a cautious 
practitioner or caseworker may never know if he or she has the neces-
sary information to ensure an accurate determination.200 Therefore, 
states must collectively protect children’s rights and mental safety by 
ensuring the complete certainty of medical records.201 This requires 
the aid of the federal government through a national database of foster 
children’s medical records and case information, thereby preventing 
misdiagnosis and protecting the children’s best interests.202 
 A national database would force states to create measures that pre-
serve children’s rights, punish state actors that violate these rights, and 
promote cross-border communication methods.203 A federal govern-
mental advisory body may implement this database, review and pro-
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mote the best oversight and treatment practices, quantify the impact on 
a child’s well-being, and protect rights and liberties.204 Furthermore, 
this comprehensive and collaborative national database would meet all 
six criteria for a successful foster care system, thereby protecting foster 
children’s safety and constitutional rights and dismissing irresponsible 
caseworkers and practitioners.205 
Conclusion 
 Over-prescription of psychotropic medication turns many foster 
children into victims of chemical abuse and infringes their constitu-
tional and natural rights. Even though psychotropic medication should 
only be used as a last resort, caseworkers and practitioners have wide 
discretionary power in determining what medication is in a child’s best 
interest. This discretionary authority can become dangerous when the 
actors lack the evidence or the ability to make a proper judgment. 
When states fail to provide measures to ensure that discretion is not 
abused, they miss the problem, cannot hold irresponsible actors ac-
countable, cause harm to foster children, and potentially prevent chil-
dren from bringing claims for relief. Although some states have im-
plemented oversight, all states should follow suit and the federal gov-
ernment should regulate state collaboration to protect the health, 
safety, welfare, and rights of foster children. 
 
204 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 19; Talmadge, supra note 32, at 190–92; Bran-
dow, supra note 26, at 1176. 
205 See Leslie et al., supra note 29, at 9–10, 12–13, 15; Foti et al., supra note 128, at 38; 
Brandow, supra note 26, at 1176; Leslie et al., supra note 124; supra notes 73–82, 134–138 
and accompanying text. 
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